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Fourth District Court for Utah County 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT FOR THE STATE OF UTAH 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * 
T. VAL CHRISTIANSEN, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
-vs-
UTAH-IDAHO SUGAR COMPANY, 
a corporation, and UNION 
PACIFIC RAILROAD, a 
corporation, 
Defendants-Respondents. 
* * * * * * * * 
CASE NO. 15751 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 
BRIEF IN OPPOSITION OF DEFENDANTS-RESPOUDENTS' 
PETITION FOR REHEARING 
Statement of Case 
Plaintiff-Appellant appealed from the Summary Judgment 
of the Honorable J, Robert Bullock. This court reviewed the 
file, as well as the Original Brief and Reply Brief of Plaintiff-
Appellant, and the Brief of Defendants-Respondents. Neither party 
requested oral argument. After consideration, this court re-
versed the Summary Judgment previously granted and remanded 
the case for trial. Defendants-Respondents then filed a Petition 
for Rehearing, and subsequent to the Petition, counsel for 
Defendants-Respondents made a formal withdrawal of counsel. 
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Argument 
POINT I 
DEFENDANTS-RESPONDENTS' PETITION FOR REHEARING 
IS IMPROPER IN LIGHT OF THE FACTS AND CIRCUM-
STANCES OF THIS CASE AND SHOULD BE DENIED. 
The law is well established in Utah that in order to 
justify the granting of a Petition for Rehearing, the Petitioner 
has the burden of making a strong showing justifying the Petitio:I 
', 
The Defendants-Respondents in the present case have failed to 
meet that burden. 
This court set forth the requirement necessary for the 
granting of a Petition for Rehearing as early as 1885. The cour:' 
in Vernard v Old Hickory M & S Co., 4 Utah 67,7 P 408 (1885): 
"To justify a rehearing, a strong case must be 
made. We must be convinced, either that the court 
failed to duly consider some material point in 
the case, or that it erred in its conclusions, or 
that some matter has been discovered which was 
unknown at the time." 
In the present case the court had sufficient information supplies 
to it, in order to render an informed decision. Defendants-
Respondents have made no allegation in their petition that any 
additional matter has been discovered which was unknown at the 
time of the decision by this court. The opinion of the court 
fully sets forth the basis for their decision and indicates that 
the court duly considered all material points, applicable statut 
and controlling case law. 
Defendants-Respondents in their Petition for Rehearing 
are merely attempting to re argue the same major points that haV' 
been previously raised and decided by this court. As this court 
- 2 -
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has held in Ducheneau v House, 4 Utah 483, 11 p 618 (1886): 
"We again say that we cannot grant a rehearing 
unless a strong showing therefor be made. A re-
argument, or an a~g1;1ffient with the court upon the 
points of the decision, with no new light given 
is not such a showing." ' 
It is well settled that all points and arguments by a 
party, to an appeal, must be timely raised. A party cannot raise 
new issues, points, or theories on a petition for rehearing. 
At the Petition for Rehearing step in the procedure, any matters 
not previously presented are waived. This court in, Dahlquist v 
Denver & R. G. R. Co., 52 Utah 438, 174 P 833, cited 4 c. J. 
627, 268 and approved of the rule stated therein, as follows: 
"A rehearing will not be granted on the ground that 
petitioner has failed to argue an important point 
on the hearing. All points relied upon in support 
of the case must be presented by the briefs and 
arguments on appeal, and the practice of reserving 
certain points to be argued subsequently, in the 
event of an adverse decision, is condemned by the 
courts." 
This rule has deemed extremely important and is so firmly 
established that this court in the case of, Pingree Nat. Bank 
of Ogden v Weber County, 54 Utah 599, 183 P 334 (1919) denied 
consideration of the constitutionality of a statute because this 
contention was first raised as error on a petition for rehearing. 
The court stated: 
"An inflexible rule of this court reauires that 
every proposition relied on as ground for reversing 
a judgment must be assigned as error. It is one of 
our most important rules of practice and its .. 
importance has been emphasized in numerous decisions 
of this court. Lyon v Mauss, 31 Utah, 283, 87 Pac. 
1014; Egelund v Fayter, 172 Pac. 313; Holt v. Great 
Eastern Casualty Co., 173 Pac. 1168." 
- 3 -
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This same rule has prevented this court from considering whethe: 
a party had waived a reply to a counterclaim by failing t o rep!: 
to that counterclaim. In, Swanson v Sims, 51 Utah 485, 170 p ;: 
(1918) this court stated: 
"Now, for the first time, we are presented with a 
new theory. Counsel ought to at least be consistent. 
We considered the questions argued by counsel, and 
decided the case on the theory contended for by hiM, 
and he will not now be permitted to present to this 
court a new theory or contention which was neither in 
the record as it was before this court nor in the 
arguments made. Under the circumstances we do not 
feel called upon to pass upon the question as to 
whether appellant might not or did not waive the 
filing of reply." 
As exemplified in the above cases, this rule has been strictly 
construed, and has been deemed so important that it can prevent 1. 
constitutional consideration of a statute as well as considerat:::. 
of a waiver based on an unanswered counterclaim. Certainly, 
Defendants-Respondents cannot seriously contend that they have 
met the burden of showing sufficient grounds for granting a 
rehearing in this particular situation. 
Defendants-Respondents' petition for a Rehearing shouM 
be denied. 
POINT II 
DEFENDANTS-RESPONDENTS' ARGUMENT THAT THIS COURT 
FAILED TO CONSIDER UTAH CASE LAW IN ITS DETERMINATION 
IS WITHOUT MERIT, ON ITS FACE. 
I 
Defendants-Respondents' primary argument used to 
their patition for Rehearing is that the court failed to 
the Utah case of, Soderberg v Holt, 86 Utah 485, 46 P 2d 
support I 
. a I 
cons1 e: i 
428 j 
(1935), and the ramifications of Soderberg on the present case. 
Plaintiff-Appellant would point out that both parties to this ar'~ 
- 4 -
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have cited extensively from the Soderberg case. (The Defendants-
Respondents on pages eleven through fourteen of their brief, 
and the Plaintiff-Appellant on pages four and six of their 
initial brief and pages two and eight of their reply brief). 
Defendants-Respondents have acknowledged that the court cited 
the Soderberg case in their opinion, but allege that this court 
did not consider the Soderberg case, it determining when a cause 
of action accrues. Plaintiff-Appellant submits that this con-
tention is erroneous on its face. The Soderberg case is cited 
by this court in the same paragraph and immediately prior to the 
portion of the opinion in which this court holds: 
"The time the cause of action occurs therefore, is the 
time at which the grantee first receives notice either 
actual or constructive, of an encumbrance against his 
property." 
Defendants-Respondents' contention is without merit. 
Alternatively, Defendants-Respondents argue that if the 
court did consider the Soderberg case in deciding the present 
case, the court is in effect reversing Soderberg. Plaintiff-
Appellant submits that this contention is also without merit. 
Both Appellant and Respondents have cited the Soderberg case 
and this court has accepted Appellant's analysis as further 
supported by another decision of this court, to wit: Pacific 
Bond & Mortgage Company v Rohn, 101 U. 335, 121 P. 2d 635 (1942). 
The court in its opinion specifically refers to Soderberg 
in the same citation as it makes reference to the Pacific Bond 
and Mortgage Company v Rohn case. Defendants-Respondents make 
no mention of this second case in their Petition for Rehearing. 
It appears that Defendants-Respondents are merely trying to reargu 
- 5 -
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points, theories, and issues that have previously been raised 
and decided by this court. The opinion in this case is in ~~ 
formance with Utah law. 
Plaintiff-Appellant subMits that Defendants-Respondent 
Petition for Rehearing is clearly inadequate and erroneous on 
1 
face. This court has not left any dispute on the question of 
when a party to an appeal should make a petition for rehearing. 
As stated in, Cummings v Nielson, 42 Utah 157, 129 P. 619 (19!; 
"When this court, however, has considered and 
decided all of the material questions involved 
in a case, a rehearing should not be applied 
for, unless we have misconstrued or overlooked 
some material fact or facts, or have overlooked 
some statute or decision which may affect the 
result, or that we have based the decision on 
some wrong principle of law, or have either mis-
applied or overlooked something which materially 
affects the result. In this case nothing was 
done or attempted by counsel, except to reargue the 
very propositions we had fully considered and 
decided. If we should write opinions on all the 
petitions for rehearings filed, we would have to 
devote a very large portion of our time in 
answering counsel's contentions a second time; 
and, if we should grant rehearingsbecause they 
are demanded, we should do nothing else save 
to write and rewrite opinions in a few cases." 
Plaintiff-Appellant respectfully submits that Defendants' 
Petition for Rehearing is without merit and this court should 1 
consider the reasonable award of attorney's fees and costs 
occasioned by the need to respond to Defendants-Respondents' '1 
petition. 
POINT III 
THIS COURT HAS DETEPMINED THAT MATERIAL ISSUES 
OF FACT REMAIN TO BE DECIDED, TO WIT: WHEN 
PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT FIRST RECEIVED NOTICE OF THE 
EASEMENT, AND WHETHER PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT WAS 
EVER EVICTED FROM THE PROPERTY IN QUESTION. 
- 6 -
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A. THE TIME THAT PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT FIRST RECEIVED 
NOTICE OF THE EASEMENT IS THE MATERIAL ISSUE OF FACT 
CONCERNING WHEN THE CAUSE OF ACTION AROSE AND WHEN 
THE STATUTE OF LIMITATION COMMENCED .RUNNING. 
Defendants-Respondents argue that the time of notice 
of this easement is immaterial to Plaintiff-Appellant's cause 
of action. As Plaintiff-Appellant has stressed in POINT II 
of this brief, under the law of the State of Utah, the cause 
of action cannot commence until Plaintiff-Appellant was put on 
notice of the easement. The court has previously decided that 
issue. The court has ruled: 
"Before the statute of limitations problem can 
be resolved it must be precisely determined as 
to when Plaintiff first learned of the encum-
brance. This is a factual matter which must 
be resolved at trial." 
This is a substantial factual matter and a legitimate 
area of dispute. Defendants-Respondents' attempt to characterize 
this in any other light is in direct contradiction of the 
holding in this court, both in the present case and in pre-
viously decided cases. 
B. DEFENDANTS-RESPONDENTS' ARGUMENT THAT PLAINTIFF-
APPELLANT HAS NOT BEEN EVICTED, EITHER ACTUALLY OR 
CONSTRUCTIVELY, FAILS TO CONFRONT THE PERTINENT 
ISSUE REGARDING EVICTION. 
Plain tiff has alleged that, "but for", this easement 
or encumbrance resulting in a cloud to his title, he would have 
been able to sell or refinance this property, thus preventing 
his loss of the subject property. This court ruled that this 
eviction: 
"may be either actual or constructive"· 
Defendants-Respondents seem to argue that because 
they did not personally evict the Plaintiff-Appellant there 
was in fact no eviction. This argument fails to take into Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
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consideration Plaintiff-Appellant's allegations as to the 
cause and result relationship between the Defendants-Responder 
granting of this easement, and the Plaintiff-Appellant's beinci 
evicted from his property. It is undisputed that Defendants-
Respondents did in fact convey the easement in question. If 
Plaintiff-Appellant can show, at time of trial, that as a dire 
result of Defendants-Respondents' action no buyer or lending' 
institution was willing to buy or refinance this property, anc, 
as a direct result thereof he lost the property, this is certt 
a constructive eviction. 
The court was fully apprised of the law in regard to 1 
eviction. Both parties presented that point extensively in 
their respective briefs. Plaintiff-Appellant's claim is not 
merely that an eviction took place, because of a mortgage fon·, 
closure, but that this 
not for the actions of 
material issue of fact 
foreclosure would not have occurred we!! 
the Defendants-Respondents. This is a\ 
and so determined by this court. 
CONCLUSION 
Defendants-Respondents have failed to meet the burden\ 
of establishing sufficient grounds for a rehearing. Their I 
petition is an attempt to reargue the same points, arguments,, 
and theories that were originally presented to this court. 
Their attempt to have this court specifically reverse the 
Soderberg case fails to consider the language of that case, 
as well as subsequent case law. 
- 8 -
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Material issues of fact remain to be decided, and 
Plaintiff-Appellant should be allowed to proceed at the 
time of trial. 
Defendants-Respondents' Petition for Rehearing should 
be denied. 
I of~ _, ~ 
DATED this 2([} day of f-.. )_JJ-A~-:/ 1979. 
Respectfully submitted, 
COHNE, RAPPAPORT & SEGAL 
By: 
Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellant 
I hereby certify that I hand delivered a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing Brief of Plaintiff-Appellant to 
McKay, Burton, Thurman & Condie, Attorneys for Defendants-
Respon~ts, 500 Kennecott Building, Salt Lake City, Utah 
thi• i'.fu ay of February, 1979~rt_). t @ r() ~ 
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